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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BELL V. ITAWAMBA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD: THE NEED FOR A
BALANCE OF FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY

I. INTRODUCTION
“Threats to freedom of speech, writing and action, though often trivial in
isolation, are cumulative in their effect and, unless checked, lead to a general
1
disrespect for the rights of the citizen.”

In 1969, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
provided the standard for evaluating whether the First Amendment protects a
student’s speech. 2 Tinker recognized that students do not forfeit all First
Amendment rights to free speech and expression, 3 but the First Amendment
does not provide students absolute rights to these freedoms. 4 In order to keep
school officials safe and still allow officials to teach students the boundaries of
socially appropriate behavior, these First Amendment rights must be
tempered. 5
For over forty-eight years, courts across the country have continued to
apply Tinker to First Amendment student speech cases. 6 The standard set forth
in Tinker stated a student “may express his opinions . . . if he does so without
‘materially and substantially interfer(ing) with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school’ and without colliding with the rights
of others.” 7 When Tinker was written, however, the use of the internet as a
medium for student speech was not in the Court’s mind. 8 Cellphones,
smartphones, and digital social media did not exist at that time. 9 Courts have
recognized that the advent of these technologies and their sweeping adoption
by students creates new and evolving challenges for school administrators. 10
Despite recognizing Tinker’s lack of addressing this technological evolution,
1. 4 GEORGE ORWELL, IN FRONT OF YOUR NOSE 447 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds.,
1968).
2. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 390 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
3. Id. at 389.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 389–90 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986);
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007)).
6. See generally Bell, 799 F.3d at 390.
7. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
8. Bell, 799 F.3d at 401.
9. Id. at 392.
10. Id.
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Tinker was still applied in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, proclaiming
a broad reach of power for school boards to punish students for purely offcampus internet speech. 11
Part II of this Casenote will provide a brief history of cases which have
shaped the standards being applied to First Amendment student speech cases
today. Part III will discuss the factual background and various opinions written
in the Bell case. Part IV analyzes the decision and recommendations set forth
by both the majority and dissents in Bell, and presents a proposed standard to
address the technological evolution concerning student speech and First
Amendment protection.
II. HISTORY OF FIRST AMENDMENT STUDENT SPEECH CASES
The First Amendment states “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech.” 12 It does not follow, however, that the same latitude
given to adults’ freedom of speech must be permitted to children in public
school. 13 While restrictions on free speech exist in a public school setting, it
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers “completely shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.” 14 The necessity of balancing these competing interests led to the
standard provided in Tinker in 1969, helping to evaluate when the First
Amendment protects a student’s speech. 15
In Tinker, the Court reviewed the suspension of students who wore black
arm bands to protest against the Vietnam War. 16 Focusing primarily on the
effect the speech had on the school community, the Court held that the
students’ speech was protected under the First Amendment. 17 The students’
conduct neither disrupted schoolwork nor interfered with the rights of other
students, and “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” 18 However, when
speech materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others, it is not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech. 19

11. Id. at 403 (Dennis, J., dissenting). The majority even recognizes that there are aspects of
off-campus speech that the court needs to provide guidance on, in large part to the pervasive use
of social media. However, the majority passes on the responsibility to provide clarity on this issue
to a different court on a different day.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
14. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
15. Bell, 799 F.3d at 390.
16. Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505–14).
17. Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
18. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
19. Id. at 513.
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Three years after Tinker, the Fifth Circuit in Shanley v. Northeast
Independent School District, Bexar County, Texas held that the Tinker standard
may be satisfied by either showing that an actual disruption has occurred, or by
showing “demonstrable factors that would give rise to any reasonable forecast
by the school administration of ‘substantial and material’ disruption.” 20 The
Court stated this applied to student conduct occurring “in class or out of it,”
and supplemented examples of what constituted “out of class” as including the
cafeteria, playing field, or on campus during authorized hours. 21
In the years since Tinker was initially decided, the Supreme Court has
examined three other notable First Amendment student speech cases, each time
fine-tuning and carving out exceptions to the Tinker standard. 22 In Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court reviewed a student’s suspension
following his use of lewd and sexual language in a nomination speech at a
school assembly. 23 Noting the 600-student audience, some as young as
fourteen years old, the Court held that school district acted within its authority
in sanctioning the student. 24 The Court noted that school officials were not
precluded by the First Amendment from restricting this lewd and sexuallycharged speech because the dialogue was “inconsistent with the ‘fundamental
values’ of the public school education.” 25 This provided the first exception
which permits deviation from Tinker’s general standard, providing a school
authority to restrict or punish speech which is lewd or indecent. 26
Continuing to provide restrictive authority to schools, the 1988 decision in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier precluded students from publishing
controversial topics in a school sponsored newspaper. 27 Students who wrote
for the newspaper alleged their First Amendment rights were violated when the
principal omitted two pages from the original publication which concerned
controversial topics, including the students’ experiences with pregnancy and
divorce. 28 The Court held that educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities, so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate

20. Bell, 799 F.3d at 390 (quoting Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., Bexar Cnty., Tex. 462
F.2d 960, 974 (5th Cir. 1972)).
21. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13 (drawing distinction to school-related activities which occur
outside the physical four walls of a classroom, not including non-school related activities which
are completely separate from school or the classroom).
22. Bell, 799 F.3d at 390.
23. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986).
24. Id. at 677, 685.
25. Id. at 685–86.
26. Id. at 676.
27. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988).
28. Id. at 264.
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pedagogical concerns. 29 Relevant to the Court’s analysis was the fact that the
newspaper did not constitute a public forum for expression, providing the
school with greater authority to regulate the contents in a reasonable manner.30
The Hazelwood Court distinguished their holding from Tinker as applying only
where the public might reasonably perceive the speech to bear the imprimatur
of the school. 31
One of the more recent decisions by the Supreme Court concerning
restriction of student speech in the public school context was Morse v.
Frederick in 2007. 32 In Morse, the principal demanded a student take down a
banner he had raised at a school-sponsored event with the message, “Bong Hits
4 Jesus,” which referenced illegal use of marijuana. 33 The student, Frederick,
was subsequently suspended for refusing to do so. 34 Frederick initially claimed
this was not “school speech” because it occurred across the street from the
school. 35 The Court quickly refuted this argument, as the event occurred during
normal school hours, it was sanctioned by Principal Morse as an approved
social event or class trip, and school rules expressly stated that students at
approved social events and class trips are subject to district rules for student
conduct. 36 The court noted that there is some uncertainty at the outer
boundaries as to when courts should apply school speech precedents, but here
there is no uncertainty that Frederick cannot “stand in the midst of his fellow
students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he is
not at school.” 37 Although his self-identified intentions were not to promote
drug use, Frederick’s asserts no motive for holding the banner that would make
the language on the banner permissible, nor does Frederick argue that the
banner conveys any sort of political or religious message. 38 Absent these
assertions, the Court found this was merely a case where speech that is
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use may be restricted by a

29. Id. at 273.
30. Id. at 270. The newspaper was written and edited by the Journalism II class at
Hazelwood East and funded by the Board of Education. Id. at 262.
31. Id. at 270–271.
32. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007).
33. Id. at 397–398. The Olympic Torch Relay was passing through town near the school.
Morse, the school principal, decided to permit staff and students to participate in the Torch Relay
as an approved social event or class trip. Frederick held up the fourteen-foot banner as the
torchbearers and camera crews passed by.
34. Id. at 398.
35. Id. at 400.
36. Id. at 400–01.
37. Id. at 401.
38. Morse, 551 U.S. at 402–03. The majority disagreed with the dissent’s notion that speech
of this nature is needed to foster “national debate about a serious issue.” Frederick’s own
admission of no political motive nullified the notion put forth by the dissent. Id. at 402.
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principal, and remains consistent with the First Amendment. 39 This created the
final standard which permits deviation from the general Tinker standard, where
schools have authority over speech advocating drug use that poses a threat to
the physical safety of students. 40 The court did note that this regulation was at
the far reaches of what the First Amendment permits, and the opinion does not
endorse any further extension. 41
Following this line of cases, the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a
public school may regulate students’ online, off-campus speech, and if so,
under what circumstances. 42 With this lack of Supreme Court precedent, courts
have continued to apply Tinker and its progeny to First Amendment student
speech cases without addressing the technological evolution present in today’s
society. 43 However, because Tinker allows for the suppression of student
speech based on its consequences rather than its content, expansive off-campus
application of Tinker creates “a precedent with ominous implications.” 44
Continuing to apply Tinker and its progeny would empower schools to regulate
students’ expressive activity no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or
what subject matter it involves—so long as it causes a substantial disruption at
school.” 45 This application does not adequately address the evolving
technology present in today’s schools, which was not present in 1969 in
Tinker. This is made clear in the recent miscellany of opinions from the Fifth
Circuit in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board. 46
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
On January 5, 2011, Taylor Bell, a student at Itawamba Agricultural High
School in Itawamba County, Mississippi, posted a rap recording to his public
Facebook profile, and later on his public YouTube page. 47 The recording partly
alleged misconduct by two of the high school’s coaches, who Bell referred to
by name, as well as additional emotionally-charged and intense language. 48

39. Id. at 403.
40. Id. at 425.
41. Id.
42. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 427 (5th Cir. 2015) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting).
43. Id. at 424–25.
44. Id. at 402 (Elrod, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 402 (citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 939 (3d
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Smith, J., concurring) (five-judge concurrence opining that Tinker does not
apply off campus)).
46. See generally Bell, 799 F.3d 379.
47. Bell, 799 F.3d at 383.
48. Id.
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The version of the rap recording which was stipulated to be accurate by the
party stated in relevant part: 49
Let me tell you a little story about these Itawamba coaches / dirty ass niggas
like some fucking coacha roaches . . .
I’m a serve this nigga, like I serve the junkies with some crack . . .
Run up on T–Bizzle / I’m going to hit you with my rueger . . .
. . . you fucking with the wrong one / going to get a pistol down your mouth /
Boww
. . . middle fingers up if you want to cap that nigga / middle fingers up / he get
50
no mercy nigga

After the wife of one of the coaches who was named in the rap recording
heard about the rap from a friend, she notified the coach. 51 The coach asked a
student at school about the recording, and the student allowed the coach to
listen to the recording on the student’s cell phone internet capabilities while at
the school. 52 The coach immediately reported the rap recording to the
principal, and subsequently the school district’s superintendent. 53
The next day, Bell was questioned about the rap by school officials, and he
was ultimately sent home from school for the day as a consequence of the
recording. 54 Despite having been questioned about the recording, Bell made a
finalized version over the next few days while school was not in session. 55 The
finalized version of the recording included extended commentary and various
pictures, and was later uploaded to a public YouTube channel. 56
Upon returning to school several days later, Bell was immediately removed
from class and issued a suspension until further notice pending a disciplinary
hearing. 57 The school district’s reasoning for the suspension was that Bell had
violated school policy which lists harassment, intimidation, or threatening
other students and/or teachers as a severe disruption. 58
At Bell’s subsequent disciplinary hearing, Bell stated that he did not report
the coaches’ improprieties because he thought he would be ignored. 59

49. These are the lines from the rap song that the court primarily focused on in its analysis.
50. Id. at 384. Bell’s use of “rueger” [sic] references a firearm manufactured by Sturm,
Ruger & Co. Id. at 385.
51. Id. at 385. A “public” Facebook or YouTube page would permit any internet user to be
able to access the page without requiring special permission from the creator of the page.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Bell, 799 F.3d at 385.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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However, Bell thought the rap recording would get more attention because
people would listen to it. 60 Bell stated he knew it would be viewed and heard
by students. 61 Notation was made that Bell did not believe the teachers would
hear the recording though. 62 Despite Bell’s attempts, the disciplinary hearing
did not address these alleged improprieties by the coaches. 63 The hearing was
narrowly focused on whether Bell had threatened, harassed, and intimidated
the teachers, and if his suspension should be upheld. 64
The next day, Bell was informed that the committee conducting the
disciplinary hearing had found his rap recording constituted harassment and
intimidation of the two teachers in violation of district policy. 65 Bell’s
previously issued suspension was to be upheld, and further, Bell would be
transferred to an alternative school for the remainder of the grading period and
would not be allowed to attend any school functions. 66
On appeal of the disciplinary hearing, the committee came to a similar
result as the initial hearing. 67 This time, however, the committee found that not
only had Bell harassed and intimidated teachers with his rap recording, but
Bell had also threatened them. 68
On February 24, 2011, Bell filed a legal cause of action, claiming, inter
alia, that his First Amendment rights to free speech had been violated. 69 From
that point, Bell’s case was heard by the Court on four separate occasions,
culminating in the most recent en banc hearing by the Fifth Circuit. 70
Bell initially requested a preliminary injunction, requesting immediate
reinstatement to his high school, and restoration of all privileges as though no
disciplinary action had ever been imposed. 71 Several individuals testified at
this hearing, including Bell, his mother, the school-board attorney, the
superintendent, both coaches mentioned in the rap recording, and an expert in
rap music. 72 Both coaches testified that the rap recording had adversely
affected their work at the school. 73 Coach W. testified that he interpreted the
60. Bell, 799 F.3d at 385.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 386. Bell did note, however, that at least 2,000 people had contacted him about the
rap recording after hearing it on Facebook and YouTube. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Bell, 799 F.3d at 386.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 386–87.
68. Id. at 387.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 388–89.
71. Bell, 799 F.3d at 387.
72. Id. The rap expert testified that the statements in Bell’s recording were nothing more
than “colorful language” reflective of the norm among young rap artists. Id. at 387–388.
73. Id. at 388.
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lyrics of the rap in a literal sense and he was “scared.” 74 Coach R. testified that
it affected the way he conducted himself around students, pursuant to the
claims alleged in the rap. 75 At the end of the hearing, the district court ruled
that to grant the injunction would be moot, since Bell’s last day attending the
alternative school would be the next day. 76
The magistrate judge next issued an order stating the parties should resolve
the case via motions for summary judgment, as there were no factual issues
remaining. 77 Following a submission of summary judgement motions by both
parties, the district court denied the Bells’ motion and granted the school
board’s motion on Mary 15, 2012. 78 The court concluded that the rap
constituted “harassment and intimidation of teacher and possible threats
against teachers and threatened, harassed, and intimidated school
employees.” 79 The court continued that the rap recording “in fact caused a
material and/or substantial disruption at school and . . . it was reasonably
foreseeable to school officials the song would cause such a disruption.” 80
Bell then challenged the summary judgment ruling against him on appeal.
In December 2014, a divided panel held, inter alia, the school board violated
Bell’s First Amendment right by disciplining him based on the language
contained in the rap recording, and reversed the district court’s ruling. 81 En
banc review was granted in February 2015. 82
IV. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT FAILS TO ADDRESS EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY
A.

Majority Opinion

On August 20, 2015, Judge Barksdale, writing for the majority opinion,
affirmed the decision of the district court. 83 The Court notes that it is necessary
to balance the Constitutional rights of students with the need to protect those
who are entrusted with their care. 84 Since “the Constitutional rights of students
74. Id.
75. Id. Coach R stated he would no longer work with female members of the track team
pursuant to the allegations. Bell, 799 F.3d at 388.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 859 F.Supp.2d 834, 840 (N.D. Miss. 2012)
aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014) on reh’g en banc, 799
F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) and aff’d, 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015)).
80. Id. (quoting Bell, 859 F.Supp.2d at 840).
81. Bell, 799 F.3d at 388–389 (citing Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 304–
05 (5th Cir. 2014) reh’g en banc granted, 782 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2015) and on reh’g en banc, 799
F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015)).
82. Id. at 389.
83. Id. at 400.
84. Bell, 799 F.3d at 389–90.
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in public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
other settings,” 85 speech that is otherwise protected may not be afforded First
Amendment protection in the school setting. 86
In determining the applicable standard to be applied to Bell’s case, the
Court notes that Tinker provides “conduct by the student, in class or out of it,
which for any reason . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized . . . .” 87
Further, the Tinker standard may be satisfied by proof of an actual disruption
occurring, or by showing “demonstrable factors that would give rise to any
reasonable forecast by the school administration of ‘substantial and material’
disruption.” 88
Before settling on the Tinker framework, the Court reviews pertinent case
law to determine if any of the narrow exceptions to the general Tinker standard
are controlling. 89 These exceptions include speech advocating illegal drug
use, 90 school-sponsored speech, 91 and lewd, vulgar, or indecent speech. 92 In
addition to the three exceptions recognized by the Supreme Court, the Fifth
Circuit also reviews their decision in Ponce v. Socorro Independent School
District, which extends the Morse exception to include certain threats of school
violence. 93 In Ponce, the court upheld a student’s suspension as being
constitutional by extending the Morse exception recognizing promotion of
illegal drug use to cover speech “bearing the stamp of . . . mass, systematic
school-shootings” based on the “[l]ack of forewarning and the frequent setting
within schools [which] give mass shootings the unique indicia that the
concurring opinion [in Morse] found compelling with respect to drug use.”94
The concurrence in Morse found that the school may discipline a student for
speech which poses a “grave and . . . unique threat to the physical safety of
students,” which included promoting illegal drug use. 95 The student in Ponce
had brought a diary to school with terroristic threats mirroring recent mass
school shootings. 96 Finding that this threat would fall into the “unique threat to
85. Id. at 390 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)).
88. Id. (quoting Shanley v. Ne. Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 974 (5th Cir. 1972))
(holding school’s suspension of students for their off-campus distribution of “underground”
newspaper violated Tinker).
89. Id.
90. Bell, 799 F.3d at 390 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 425 (2007)).
91. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)).
92. Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
93. Id. at 391 (citing Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 771–72 (5th Cir.
2007)).
94. Id. (quoting Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771).
95. Id. (quoting Morse, 551 U.S. at 425 (Alito, L., concurring)).
96. Bell, 799 F.3d at 391 (citing Ponce, 508 F.3d at 767).
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the physical safety of students” category articulated in Morse, the court
extended this exception to include instances indicative of mass school
shootings. 97
After reviewing the standards available for analyzing student speech cases,
the Court determined that the speech at issue was not disciplined based on
lewdness or potential perception of being sponsored by the school. 98 As such,
Fraser and Hazelwood are not on point and are excluded as viable applicable
standards. 99 The speech did not advocate illegal drug use or foreshadow a
Columbine-like mass, systematic school-shooting, thus eliminating the
standards set forth in Morse or Ponce. 100 The Court additionally notes that
violence forecast by a student against a teacher does not reach the level of the
above-mentioned exceptions compelling divergence from Tinker’s general
rule. 101 Via process of elimination, 102 the Court determines that Bell’s speech
should be analyzed under Tinker. 103
The court proceeds to defend its decision to apply Tinker to off-campus
speech, since Bell contends the standard is strictly reserved for on-campus
speech only. 104 The court recognizes the confounding effect that the advent of
technologies (such as internet, cellphones, social media, etc.) has had on school
administrators and their attempts to delineate boundaries and regulations to
keep their schools and students safe. 105 In light of these competing concerns, as
well as differing standards applied across circuits, the scope of schools’
authority to restrict or discipline off-campus speech has been drawn into
question. 106 Justice Thomas has been critical of the Supreme Court’s failure to
offer an explanation of when Tinker is applicable or not, stating “I am afraid
that our jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in schools
except when they do not.” 107
Bell’s case focuses on the principal need for school officials to be able to
react quickly and efficiently to protect students and faculty from threats,
97. Id.
98. Id. at 391–92.
99. Id. at 392.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 392.
102. Bell, 799 F.3d at 391 (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d
Cir. 2001)) (employing a similar approach where “[s]peech falling outside of . . . categories [such
as those in Fraser and Hazelwood] is subject to Tinker’s general rule”).
103. Id. at 392.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013)
(recognizing the daunting task school administrators face of evaluating potential threats of
violence and keeping students safe without impinging on their constitutional rights).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 392–93 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 418 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
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intimidation, and harassment intentionally directed at the school community. 108
As such, the Court held that Tinker can apply to off-campus student speech,
but fails to specify the precise times in which it is applicable. The Court
supports this determination by looking to a line of five circuits, including their
own, which have addressed affirmatively that Tinker applies to off-campus
speech. 109 The Third Circuit has addressed the issue, but remains unsolved due
to an intra circuit split. 110 The remainder of the circuits (First, Sixth, Seventh,
Tenth, Eleventh, D.C.) do not appear to have addressed the issue. 111 More
significantly noted, the Supreme Court has also failed to address the issue.
However, the Fifth Circuit has applied Tinker on multiple occasions to analyze
the constitutionality of a school board disciplining off-campus student
speech. 112 Therefore, based on the Fifth Circuit’s precedent and guidance by
sister circuits, the Court found that Tinker can be applicable to off-campus
speech in certain situations.
Several other courts have advocated various approaches for when Tinker
would be applicable to off-campus speech. The Ninth Circuit in Wynar held
that schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that
meets the requirements of Tinker when there is an identifiable threat of school
violence. 113 The Third Circuit in Snyder held that the location of a speaker
does not matter since the internet accommodates an “everywhere at once”
nature. 114 Off-campus student can be restricted so long as it was “intentionally
directed towards a school.” 115 The Fourth Circuit requires a “sufficiently
strong nexus” between the student speech and the school’s pedagogical
interests before a student’s speech can be restricted. 116 The Eighth Circuit
applied Tinker where it was reasonably foreseeable that threats to shoot

108. Bell, 799 F.3d at 393.
109. Id. at 393–94. See e.g., Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069; D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub.
Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 766–67 (8th Cir. 2011); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652
F.3d 565, 573–74 (4th Cir. 2011); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48–50 (2d Cir. 2008).
110. Bell, 799 F.3d at 393–94.
111. Id. at 394.
112. Id. See e.g., Shanley v. Ne. Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972))
(“When the Burnside/Tinker standards are applied to this case . . . .”); See also Sullivan v. Hous.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1072 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that students who distributed an
underground newspaper near campus were protected by the First Amendment because the activity
did not approach a material and substantial disruption and there were disturbances of any sort
related to the distribution of the newspaper); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch.
Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007) (interpreting Sullivan as applying Tinker to off-campus
speech).
113. Bell, 799 F.3d at 395 (citing Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069).
114. Bell, 799 F.3d at 395 (citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Smith, J., concurring)).
115. Id. (citing Snyder, 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring)).
116. Id. (citing Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011)).
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specific students in school would create a risk of substantial disruption within
the school environment. 117 Finally, the Second Circuit held that Tinker applies
to off-campus speech where there is a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption
within the school environment and it was also foreseeable that the off-campus
speech might also reach campus. 118
Despite the multiple approaches advocated by other circuits, the Court in
Bell declined to adopt any rigid standard in this instance since such
determinations are heavily influenced by the facts in each matter. 119
Accordingly, in light of Fifth Circuit precedent, the Court simply held that
Tinker governs in this instance because a student intentionally directed at the
school community speech reasonably understood by school officials to
threaten, harass, and intimidate a teacher, even though the speech originated
and was disseminated off-campus absent use of school resources. 120
While declining to apply a “true threat” analysis to Bell’s speech, the Court
hypothesized that the statements in the rap recording constituted “threats,
harassment, and intimidation” as a layperson would understand the terms. 121
The statements in the rap threatened violence against the coaches, described
the specific injury to be inflicted, described a specific weapon to be used,
encouraged other to engage in the action, and intimidated the coaches by
telling them to “watch [their] back[s].” 122 As such, the Court found no genuine
dispute of material fact that Bell threatened, harassed, and intimidated the
coaches by intentionally directing the rap at the school community, and the
speech is subjected to the application Tinker. 123
Upon applying Tinker, the Court found that Bell’s conduct reasonably
could have been forecast to cause a substantial disruption, making the
discipline appropriate. Factors considered by other courts in determining
whether or not an actual disruption occurred or one could reasonably be
forecast include: the nature and content of the speech, the objective and
subjective seriousness of the speech, and the severity of the possible
consequences should the speaker take action; 124 the relationship of the speech

117. Id. at 395 (citing D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754,
766 (8th Cir. 2011)).
118. Id. (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008)). Doninger introduced the
foreseeability requirement, opening the door to the idea that the speaker’s intent should play some
role in the analysis. There, it mattered if the speaker knew or should have known that the speech
would actually reach the campus. Doninger, 527 F. 3d at 48.
119. Bell, 799 F.3d at 396.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 397.
124. Id. at 398 (citing Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1070–71 (9th Cir.
2013)).
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to the school, the intent of the speaker to disseminate, or keep private, the
speech, and the nature, and severity, of the school’s response in disciplining
the student; 125 whether the speaker expressly identified an educator or student
by name or reference, and past incidents arising out of similar speech; 126 the
manner in which the speech reached the school community; 127 the intent of the
school in disciplining the student; 128 and the occurrence of other in-school
disturbances, including administrative disturbances involving the speaker, such
as “[s]chool officials ha[ving] to spend considerable time dealing with these
concerns and ensuring that appropriate safety measures were in place.” 129
Applying this precedent, the Court found that a substantial disruption
reasonably could have been forecast as a matter of law. 130 The court noted that
Bell admitted he was trying to increase awareness of the situation and he was
foreshadowing something that might happen. 131 Bell also referred to the
teachers by name and used what would be understood as threatening
language. 132 Further, the rap recording was intended to be public and reach
members of the school community. 133 Judge Fisher briefly summed up the
impact certain speech can have in a school setting in the Snyder opinion:
“[W]ith near-constant student access to social networking sites on and off
campus, when offensive and malicious speech is directed at school officials
and disseminated online to the student body, it is reasonable to anticipate an
impact on the classroom environment.” 134 Bell’s speech violated school policy,
which lists harassment, intimidation, or threats to students or teachers as being
a severe disruption. 135 Violation of this school policy may be used as evidence
to support the reasonable forecast of a future substantial disruption for
purposes of applying Tinker. 136 Further, a recent uptick in school violence

125. Bell, 799 F.3d at 398 (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50–52 (2d Cir. 2008)).
126. Id. (citing Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011)).
127. Id. (citing Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 985 (11th Cir. 2007).
128. Id. (citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 929 (3d Cir.
2011) (en banc)).
129. Id. at 398 (citing D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754,
766 (8th Cir. 2011)).
130. Id.
131. Bell, 799 F.3d at 398.
132. Id. at 398–99.
133. Id. at 399.
134. Id. at 400 (quoting J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 951–52
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 399. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408–10 (2007) (relying on, inter
alia, the student’s violation of established school policy in holding the school board did not
violate the student’s First Amendment right); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
686 (1986) (noting that the school disciplinary rule prohibiting obscene language in addition to
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which was signaled by speech, writings, or actions prior to being carried out,
creates a need to identify these warning signs to prevent tragedy. 137 As such,
the Court in Bell determined the school board reasonably could have forecast a
substantial disruption at school based on the language in Bell’s rap recording,
and affirmed the judgment of the district court. 138
B.

Concurrences and Dissents

In addition to the majority opinion, there were three additional
concurrences and four dissents. The length of the full opinion, as well as the
necessity for each Judge to render their own opinion, further exemplifies the
complexity and unsettled nature of the law surrounding off-campus student
speech.
In Judge Jolly’s concurrence, he points out that the facts in Bell do not
align with Tinker, and Tinker did not address the intersection between oncampus speech and off-campus speech. 139 He goes on to note that Bell is also a
different case from Morse, Ponce, and Porter. 140 A main difference between
Bell and the preceding cases is that the internet as a medium for student speech
was not within the Court’s mind. 141 Due to the evolving common law, 142 Jolly
believes a simple decision, consonant with prior case law, would
unequivocally address these concerns:
Student speech is unprotected by the First Amendment and is subject to school
discipline when that speech contains an actual threat to kill or physically harm
personnel and/or students of the school; which actual threat is connected to the
school environment; and which actual threat is communicated to the school, or
143
its students, or its personnel.

Jolly does, however, agree with the ultimate result of the majority opinion.
Judge Elrod, joined by Judge Jones, addresses the issue that the majority
opinion subjects a broad swath of off-campus student expression to Tinker. 144
Elrod acknowledges that it has been cautioned that a broad off-campus
application of Tinker would create a precedent with ominous implications
since it allows the suppression of student speech based on its consequences
reprimand by the teacher gave the student adequate warning that his speech could subject him to
sanctions).
137. Bell, 799 F.3d at 399.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 400 (Jolly, J., concurring).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 401.
142. Id.
143. Bell, 799 F.3d at 401 (Jolly, J., concurring). “True threats” are not protected under the
First Amendment, however, a true threat analysis was not done by the court in reference to Bell’s
speech. Id. at 400.
144. Id. at 402 (Elrod, J., concurring).
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rather than its content. 145 Elrod defends the implications of the majority
opinion and notes the opinion is actually narrow and precise in its reach. 146 He
states that the case is sensibly decided, applying Tinker to Bell’s rap lyrics,
which were intentionally directed toward the school and contained threats of
physical violence. 147 By limiting the application of the school’s authority
where speech is intentionally directed toward the school and indicative of
threats of physical violence, the suppression of student speech is narrowly
contained. 148
Judge Costa’s concurrence, joined by Judge Owen and Judge Higginson,
addresses the issue that Bell’s speech was a matter of public concern
attempting to expose harassment of female students. 149 Costa notes that the
speech in Tinker was solely of public concern, being in protest of the Vietnam
War, but was still balanced against its impact on the learning environment. 150
Costa states that it is not enough to identify some portions of Bell’s rap to
elevate the speech beyond the application of the Tinker framework. 151 Costa
states that Bell’s off-campus speech is susceptible to Tinker since it is
threatening, harassing, and intimidating. 152 Costa does note, however, that
broader questions raised by off-campus speech will have to be addressed by
the higher court soon, to provide clear guidance for students, teachers and
school administrators. 153
Finally, Judge Dennis, joined by Judge Graves, and in part by Judge Prado,
delivers a 50-page dissent, strongly disagreeing with the majority. 154 The main
issue brought up by Judge Dennis is the content of the speech being on a
matter of public concern. 155 As such, the rap song “occupies the highest rung
of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.” 156 Dennis found fault in the
majority’s approach of picking out specific lines of the rap recording, rather
than looking to the overall thrust and dominant theme of the song. 157
Additionally, by applying a school policy which focuses on a layperson’s view
of what is “threatening, harassing, or intimidating,” the framework of the
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Bell, 799 F.3d at 402 (Costa, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 402–03.
151. Id. at 403.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 403–33 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
155. Bell, 799 F.3d at 403 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 404.
157. Id. (“[T]he majority opinion wholly glosses over the urgent social issue that Bell’s song
lays bare and thus flouts Supreme Court precedent requiring us to evaluate whether ‘the overall
thrust and dominant theme of [Bell’s song] spoke to broader public issues’—which it did.”).
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majority opinion fails to provide constitutionally adequate notice of when
student speech crosses the line between permissible and punishable off-campus
expression. 158 Dennis further points out that Tinker was not meant to apply to
off-campus speech, and the majority opinion allows schools an unprecedented
and unnecessary intrusion on students’ rights by permitting students’ internet
expression to be policed anytime and anywhere. 159 Dennis warns that if the
majority opinion is left uncorrected, school officials will be encouraged to
silence student speakers “solely because they disagree with the content and
form of their speech, particularly when such off-campus speech criticized
school personnel.” 160
V. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISMS OF THE BELL OPINION
The Court in Bell, like many other recent district courts, failed to address
the evolution of technology on student speech cases. 161 The Court found that
the facts in Bell did not fit one of the cases which permit a divergence from
Tinker, thus applying Tinker by default. 162 The need for the Supreme Court to
review Bell and provide a clear standard for off-campus student speech is
greater now than ever. Students are unaware of what they can and cannot say,
while school administrators are unaware of what they can and cannot censor or
punish. 163 The only certainty is that technology, computer use, and social
media are showing no signs of slowing down. 164
While a few cases have come through the Supreme Court that concerned
student speech, none of them were clearly off-campus and none of them had a
standard which aimed to fully protect student rights while balancing the
necessity of school safety. 165 Most cases solely take notice of the duty of
school officials to protect students, 166 teach students appropriate material and
behaviors, 167 and a general necessity of keeping control over the school and
students. 168 However, these approaches have lost sight of the student and the
original intent of the First Amendment to protect individual rights.

158. Id. at 405.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 405–06.
161. Bell, 799 F.3d at 417 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 392 (majority) (“[W]hen the type of violence threatened does not implicate ‘the
special features of the school environment’, Tinker’s ‘substantial disruption’ standard is the
appropriate vehicle for analyzing such claims.”).
163. See supra note 107.
164. Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005–2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 8,
2015), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015/.
165. See supra Part II: History of First Amendment Free Speech Cases.
166. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007).
167. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986).
168. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
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In a society filled with cell phones, tablets, laptops, and a new social media
craze every few months, it is clear that student speech has capabilities not
available even ten years ago. 169 The majority in Bell argue that student on-line
speech is still subject to Tinker, as this off-campus speech can still make its
way to campus and cause a disruption. 170 However, Tinker and subsequent
case law make a distinction that not all speech is immunized by a
Constitutional guarantee of free speech while at school. 171 To expand this
reduced level of freedom to online activity outside the school essentially
eliminates First Amendment rights indefinitely for students until high school
commencement. This blasé trampling of First Amendment rights of students is
not what was intended by the framers or by the established case law. 172
As made clear through the varying views of the opinion and dissents in
Bell, as well as the multiple conflicting decisions each time the case was
heard, 173 there is a great need for clarity in the analysis of First Amendment
protection for off-campus student speech, especially in light of evolving
technology. 174 It is also necessary to restore some rights to students,
particularly in an off-campus setting when they are no longer students, but are
merely average citizens. 175
The first step in resolving this confusion is to draw a bright-line as to when
the original Tinker framework is applied. As seen in the language of Tinker,
school authority is limited to geographically on-campus speech or at schoolsponsored events. 176 This follows the intent of the Supreme Court in the

169. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 392 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that over 45
years ago, when Tinker was decided, the Internet, cellphones, smartphones, and digital social
media did not exist. The advent of these technologies and their sweeping adoption by students
present new and evolving challenges for school administrators, confounding previously
delineated boundaries of permissible regulations).
170. Bell, 799 F.3d at 400 (citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
915, 951-52 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Fisher, J., dissenting) (stating that “with near-constant
student access to social networking sites on and off campus, when offensive and malicious speech
is directed at school officials and disseminated online to the student body, it is reasonable to
anticipate an impact on the classroom environment.”)).
171. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
172. Olivia A. Weil, Preserving the Schoolhouse Gates: An Analytical Framework for
Curtailing Cyberbullying Without Eroding Students’ Constitutional Rights, 11 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 541, 548 (2013).
173. See supra pp. 9–10. Trial Court found in favor of the school, the Appellate Court found
for Bell, and the Appellate Court en banc reversed again finding for the school.
174. See generally Bell, 799 F.3d at 379.
175. Scott L. Sternberg, Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: The Limits of Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, COMM. LAW., Fall 2014, at 20.
176. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13 (referencing examples of what constituted “out of class”
speech which would still be actionable by the school as including the cafeteria, playing field, or
on campus during authorized hours which is only when the speech occurs on school grounds or at
a school-sponsored event).
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original decision, as no mention is made of a school’s authority to restrict
speech extending beyond the schoolhouse gates. 177 Further, school regulations
are deemed reasonable when they are essential in maintaining order and
discipline on school property. 178 Notably absent from this statement is the
relation of school policies as applied to off-campus speech. As such, Courts
should continue to apply the original Tinker framework only to cases which
meet a bright-line showing of “on-campus” speech, where school policies are
intended to impose order and discipline. 179 However, if the speech is outside of
the geographic location of the school or not during a school-sponsored activity,
a modified standard should be applied—a standard which provides more
opportunity for a student to freely express themselves without being
susceptible to school authority twenty-four hours a day.
Prior to circumventing freedoms provided to minors by the First
Amendment, a heightened standard should be met to permit a student’s offcampus speech to be restricted. Since students only shed some Constitutional
rights behind the schoolhouse gates, inherently their rights outside of those
gates are greater. 180 To restore those rights and freedoms to students while offcampus, the Supreme Court should adopt a modification of the Tinker standard
that heightens the level of disruption necessary prior to punishing or censoring
student speech, as well as analyzes the subjective intent of the speaker.
VI. PROPOSED TINKER-BELL STANDARD FOR OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH
If speech is deemed off-campus, the threshold question as to when a school
may have the authority to restrict or punish the speech is whether or not actual
disruption occurred at the school as a result of the speech. This modifies the
Tinker standard by removing the language that speech can be restricted if it is
reasonably foreseeable that substantial material disruption could occur. 181 The
disruption must also be of a substantial or material nature, not merely a small
distraction or insignificant disruption. 182 Absent an actual substantial
disruption, the analysis stops and the school is not permitted to restrict or
punish the speech. If actual substantial disruption did occur, then the subjective
intent and purpose of the speaker shall be analyzed. If the subjective intent and
purpose of the speech served legitimate purpose, 183 the school cannot limit the
First Amendment protection provided to a student’s off-campus speech.

177. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
178. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966).
179. Id.
180. See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (noting that students do not shed all of their free
speech rights at the schoolhouse gate).
181. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 390 (5th Cir. 2015).
182. Boucher v. School Board, 134 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1998).
183. See infra Part b: Subjective Intent of the Speaker.
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Heightened Substantial Material Disruption

The first portion of the Tinker-Bell analysis is a heightened requirement for
disruption. Before a school can interject its authority over a student’s offcampus speech, there must be an actual disruption or a near certainty of risk to
school safety. Absent an actual harm or near-certain safety risk incurred by the
school, there is not a strong enough connection between the speech and the
school to justify expansion of school authority beyond the schoolhouse gate,
and into the private homes of students.
Further, cases have long used the terms “substantial” and “material”
disruption, and permit censorship and reprimand for speech which rises to this
level. However, courts have stretched these boundaries without providing a
clear understanding of what delineates a substantial or material disruption from
an insignificant disruption. For this proposed standard, a true disruption of
substantial or material proportion must occur.
There are many cases that rely on offended feelings of a listener or mere
schoolhouse chatter to meet the standard of substantial or material
disruption. 184 These cases, however, have applied a lax standard of general
disruption, rather than adhering to the importance inherent in the definitions of
substantial or material. Substantial means “considerable in importance, value,
degree, amount or extent. 185 This definition indicates that only conduct of an
increased significance would meet this standard, not trivial or inconsequential
conduct. There must be “more than some mild distraction or curiosity created
by the speech.” 186
Conduct that can be said to create a substantial or material disruption
carries a visible or tangible consequence that is directly correlated to the
speech at hand. In Boucher v. School Board, the court found that a student’s
blog post instructing how to hack the school’s computer system was a “call to
action” which could be predicted to substantially disrupt the school. 187 The
substantial disruption the court noted was the risk of numerous people hacking
the school system. 188 The consequence of the system being hacked exceeds a
trivial disruption and as such the risk alone is properly classified as being a
substantial disturbance. Further, in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School
184. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 209 (3d Cir.
2011) (discussing a principal being concerned for his reputation after students made a mock
profile online with the principal’s picture); see also J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch.
Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 922 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that there were general “rumblings” in the school
regarding the profile).
185. Substantial, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1213 (2d ed. 1982).
186. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 868 (2002) (citing
Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748).
187. Boucher, 134 F.3d at 828.
188. Id. (describing the article to be a blueprint for the invasion of the school’s computer
system along with encouragement to do just that).
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District, derogatory comments about a teacher left the teacher unable to
complete the school year or return for the next year due to stress and
anxiety. 189 Upon her absence, students lost the cohesive learning plan of the
semester by being subjected to substitute teachers for the remainder of the
school year. 190 The difference between a teacher or administrator who is
simply offended by student speech pales in comparison to the extent of
physical and emotional harm endured by this teacher. As such, the visible
disruption caused by the speech rises to a level of substantiality.
A risk to security of a school also rises to a material or substantial
disruption. 191 In Wynar v. Douglas County School District, a student engaged
in a string of violent and threatening instant messages sent from home to his
friends bragging about his weapons, threatening to shoot specific classmates,
intimating that he would “take out” other people at a school shooting on a
specific date, and invoking the image of the Virginia Tech massacre. 192 His
friends were alarmed by these messages and notified school authorities of the
risk and potential threat. 193 Based on the student’s descriptive language and
self-proclaimed accessibility to weapons, a legitimate risk was created to the
safety of the school. 194 As such, the court properly found this risk was a
substantial and material disruption to the school. Additional deference should
be given to schools when dealing with speech characteristically associated with
tragic mass school shootings. By comparing the severity of disruption caused
by student speech in these preceding cases, a common-sense analysis reveals
when disruptions are more than trivial and properly deemed substantial or
material.
B.

Subjective Intent of the Speaker

The second portion of the Tinker-Bell framework, once a substantial or
material disruption has been identified, is to analyze the subjective intent of the
speaker. Further, the intent of the speaker is vital, as it cannot be sanctioned
that the view of the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of
individual speech has little or no regard for that emotive function which
practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall
message sought to be communicated. 195 While subjective intent is hard to
189. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 416–17 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000) aff’d, 807 A.2d 847 (2002) (describing a website made containing derogatory comments
about a teacher, including calling her fat, referring to her as a bitch, and displaying a diagram of
the teacher with her head cut off and blood dripping from her neck).
190. Id. at 417.
191. Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2013)
192. Id. at 1064–65.
193. Id. at 1065.
194. Id. at 1064.
195. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
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define, there are many indicating factors which assist in identifying the actual
purpose behind students’ speech. Two major factors to consider include the
speaker’s purpose in creating or disseminating the speech and the form of the
speech.
Speech created or disseminated with the purpose of political speech,
religious matters, or matters of public concern are provided First Amendment
protection. In a case where arguably political speech is directed against the
very individuals who seek to suppress that speech, school officials do not have
limitless discretion. 196 While “much political and religious speech might be
perceived as offensive to some,” such speech “is at the core of what the First
Amendment is designed to protect.” 197 Further, speech on matters of public
concern “occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values, and is entitled to special protection.” 198 Speech of this nature on the
internet is still provided this high level of protection, as there is “no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this
medium.” 199
Although on-campus speech cases do not look to the speaker’s intent, 200 it
is of great necessity to do so when possibly censoring students’ off-campus
speech. The court in Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School
District, focused on the location of the speech, finding “because school
officials have ventured out of the school yard and into the general community
where the freedom accorded expression is at its zenith, their actions must be
evaluated by the principles that bind government officials in the public
arena.” 201 Although the court did not identify specific scenarios, it was noted
that there could be a situation in which students incite “substantial disruption
within the school from some remote locale.” 202 A heightened intent element
mirrors the public arena’s analysis of threatening language, as seen in Elonis v.
United States. Although Elonis deals in the criminal realm, it is noted that
wrongdoing must be conscious. 203 If a speaker is intending to blow the whistle
on a matter of public concern or spread a religious message, there is an absence
of any conscious wrongdoing.

196. Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 531 (9th Cir. 1992).
197. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 402 (5th Cir. 2015) (Elrod, J.,
concurring) (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403, 409 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring)).
198. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
145 (1983)).
199. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
200. Morse, 551 U.S. at 402 (denying the dissenting opinion’s contention that the court
should take into consideration the motive for the student to display the banner with language
involving illegal drug use).
201. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979).
202. Id. at 1052 n.17.
203. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2003 (2015).
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The form of the speech can also be indicative of the intent of the speaker.
Many forms of speech are utilized as expressive or artistic vehicles for a
speaker’s message. All art forms — including plays, music, dance, film,
literature, poetry and the visual arts — enjoy considerable First Amendment
protection. 204 Violent art has been a staple of human cultures since ancient
times. 205 Many human behavioralists believe that violent art has a “useful and
constructive societal role, serving as a vicarious outlet for individual
aggression.” 206 To ensure that artistic or therapeutic expression is not being
constrained, latitude should be given to speech which is in an artistic form.
This is not a one-size-fits-all approach, and should be applied in a common
sense fashion. A student who uses artistic expression as a free pass to engage
in inappropriate speech should not be afforded that opportunity. But a student
who is known to engage in certain artistic outlets should be recognized as
having a different intent or purpose when creating this art.
C. Application of Tinker-Bell Framework to Bell’s Case
Applying this new standard to Bell, the school board would fail on both
analyses. First, the alleged disturbance incurred by the school does not rise to a
substantial level, nor is there a reasonable certainty of risk to the safety of the
school. One of the teachers whose name was included in the song stated that he
viewed the rap as “just music,” and he did not take it seriously. 207 The second
teacher stated that song caused him to be more cautious around students and to
avoid the appearance that he was behaving inappropriately toward them. 208 His
discomfort stemmed more from the allegations in the rap presenting him in a
negative light. 209 As such, the reactions and alleged disturbance felt by the
teachers did not rise to the higher standard of being substantial or material.
Unlike Bethlehem, where the teacher’s response to the speech caused her
serious physical and mental harm, 210 here one teacher felt discomfort
stemming from whistleblowing allegations while the other felt no harm.
Facially, there is no tangible disruption that rises beyond mild disruption or
curiosity of the speech. Further, there is no material disruption to the school

204. Ken Paulson, Arts & First Amendment Overview, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Jan. 3,
2004), available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/arts-first-amendment.
205. Freedom of Expression in the Arts and Entertainment, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, available at https://www.aclu.org/freedom-expression-arts-and-entertainment (last visited
Feb. 14, 2016)[hereinafter Freedom of Expression].
206. Freedom of Expression, supra note 205.
207. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 289 (5th Cir. 2014) reh’g en banc
granted, 782 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc, 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 417 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000) aff’d, 807 A.2d 847 (2002).
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community as a whole, as the impact is mainly noted to be confined to the
single teacher’s uneasiness.
Further, there is no reasonably certain risk to the safety of the school.
When looking at Bell’s past, he has no history of violence or mental health
issues that would be indicative of a risk to violent behavior and had created his
recording in a professional studio. 211 There is no indication that Bell actually
had weapons or had access to weapons. 212 To the contrary, Bell had never even
been in serious trouble at school besides one instance of tardiness. 213 Unlike
LaVine v. Blaine School District, where the student had previous suicidal
intentions, had recently broken up with his girlfriend (whom he was reportedly
stalking), had several prior disciplinary problems, and had been absent from
school for three days prior to handing in a poem “filled with imagery of violent
death and suicide,” 214 here, Bell had no typical red-flags for being a potential
threat to the school.
The period of time that passed between Bell’s creation of the rap and any
action on behalf of the school also indicates no reasonably certain risk. Bell
was confronted about the rap song at school and the adverse action taken
against him was not until several days later. 215 If the school board felt there
was an actual risk to the school’s safety, the lapse of time prior to taking action
would not have been permitted. If the school perceived a reasonably certain
risk, immediate corrective action would have been essential. Beyond briefly
inquiring with Bell as to the recording, no immediate action indicating
legitimate concern on behalf of the school board was taken. 216 In combination,
these facts indicate there was no reasonably certain risk to the safety of the
school.
Assuming, arguendo, the Court would find there was either a substantial
disruption or reasonable risk, Bell’s intent and purpose in creating the rap song
outweigh any alleged disruption or risk. First, Bell’s speech exposing
wrongdoing by a teacher, especially where students are being victimized,
warrants a matter of public concern that should be given greater First
Amendment protection. 217 Bell’s own testimony indicates his goals in creating
and disseminating the song was to bring to light this misconduct, and thought
this form of exposure was the best means to uncover the issue. 218 The majority
of the rap song addressed this issue of public concern as well. 219
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Bell, 799 F.3d at 428 (Dennis, J, dissenting).
Id.
Id.
LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989–990 (9th Cir. 2001).
Bell, 799 F.3d at 385.
Id.
Bell, 799 F.3d at 404 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 385 (majority).
Id. at 384.
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In addition to the intent and purpose of the speech, Bell was expressing
himself in an artistic form. The rap song was far from an amateur compilation
of threats guised as art. Bell recorded the rap song in a professional studio and
performed two edits on the video, which he later posted to a popular artistic
media forum. 220 The history and culture of rap music shows the commonality
of vulgar and violent imagery. 221 This language and expression is often
misinterpreted by those unfamiliar with rap culture and lacking appreciation
for the artistic element intended by rap artists. 222 Here, Bell was engaging in
his artistic outlet of choice, one which he had repeatedly engaged in. 223 While
the rap did contain some violent language which is characteristic of the rap
culture, it does not discredit his expression of being worthy of artistic
designation.
The combination of exposing a matter of public concern paired with
legitimate artistic expression outweighs any alleged disruption or perceived
risk of safety at the school. To censor Bell’s speech would set an ominous
precedent of restricting student expression twenty-four hours a day. 224 To
discourage students from blowing the whistle on wrongdoing in a school
setting would prevent nearly all wrongdoing from being addressed, as students
are the best suited parties to bring these issues to light. 225 To curb students’
artistic expressions would limit not only therapeutic outlets, but could also put
a halt to possible future endeavors or careers which are artistically related. 226
On a broader level, for schools to constantly monitor and censor student speech
on social media, students would be robbed of their most vital form of
communication and expression. 227 Here, Bell’s speech on a matter of public
concern outweighs any perceived disturbance or risk to safety caused by
literary vulgar language. As such, upon application of the proposed Tinker-Bell
standard, the Supreme Court should reverse the en banc decision of the
Appellate Court in favor of Bell.
220. Id. at 428, 431.
221. See id. at 387–88.
222. AARON J. LIGHTSTONE, The Importance of Hip-Hop for Music Therapists,
THERAPEUTIC USES OF RAP AND HIP-HOP 39, 43 (Susan Hadley & George Yancy eds., 2012).
223. Bell, 799 F.3d at 428 (Dennis, J, dissenting).
224. Id. at 402 (Elrod, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 412 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
226. Famous rapper, Eminem, has created rap songs explicitly stating that he will “punch
Lana Del Rey right in the face twice, like Ray Rice,” before threatening to rape Iggy Azalea, on a
leaked track Vegas. Despite the vulgar and violent language, Eminem has had a successful music
career since the late 1990’s. Patrick Ryan, It’s 2014, So Why are Eminem’s Violent Lyrics Still
OK?, USA TODAY (Nov. 25, 2014, 8:01 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/music/2014/11
/25/eminem-shady-xv-misogyny-violence/19444645/.
227. Eight in ten online teens use some kind of social media. Mary Madden, et al., Part 1:
Teens and Social Media Use, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 21, 2013), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/05/21/part-1-teens-and-social-media-use/.
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D. Possible Objections to Proposal
Although the proposal adheres to a modified Tinker standard, there are still
divergences from the long-upheld Tinker framework that may cause concern.
First, Tinker has held that a school is not required to wait for a disruption to
occur before taking action in response to student speech. 228 The Tinker-Bell
proposal does tip the scales slightly back in favor of student freedoms, but does
so since there is less of a temporal urgency when the speech is off-campus.
Morse addressed the difficult job of school administrators when faced with a
possibly disruptive issue: “to decide to act—or not act—on the spot.” 229 When
the speech is moved off-campus, this split-second decision is not required.
With the availability of more time to assess off-campus situations, a higher
standard requiring an actual disruption should be necessary to provide the
school with the jurisdiction to exert authority. Additionally, this standard does
not propose that a school must wait for violence to actually occur prior to
stepping in. If there is a reasonably certain risk to the safety of the school, the
threshold question of the Tinker-Bell standard will also be met. The importance
of preventing and discouraging threats, especially those indicative of
systematic mass-school shootings, is addressed by not requiring a higher
standard of actual disruption in this context.
Second, schools can typically be held responsible for allowing harassment
to a student to continue after the school has become aware of the issue. 230
However, the school does not have to tolerate harassment that spills into the
school. As long as the school properly addresses any actual on-campus
harassment while students are under their care, this issue does not arise. 231
Further, this proposed standard does not prevent a school from simply
contacting a student’s parents if there is pertinent information to communicate
or behavior to address. If school authorities choose to further notify parents of
alarming behavior, this would further insulate the school from allegations of
inaction.
Finally, there may be concern that students will be able to guise their
unprotected speech as artistic or on a matter of public concern to shield
themselves from censorship or discipline. While there is always a chance that
students may attempt to disguise their speech, this is remedied by the proposal

228. Bell, 799 F.3d at 390 (quoting Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., Bexar Cnty., Tex. 462
F.2d 960, 974 (5th Cir. 1972)).
229. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–10 (2007).
230. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (holding that actions may
be brought against schools that acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in
its programs or activities).
231. See Tyrell v. Seaford Union Free Sch. Dist., 792 F.Supp.2d 601, 629 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(holding the school district did not have control in the context in which the harassment occurred
off of school grounds).
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not adhering to a rigid standard. The analysis of the intent and purpose of the
speech looks to a common-sense totality of the circumstances analysis to allow
the school some deference in determining if the public concern or artistic
nature is authentic. There is no indication that the artistic nature of Bell’s
speech or the topic of public concern were not genuine. 232 Bell stated he was
told by multiple students about the inappropriate acts engaged in by the
teachers referenced in his rap song. 233 Further, the artistic expression in rap
form is characteristic of Bell’s known identification as a rap artist. 234 He had
previously been active in the rap culture and even recorded his song in a
legitimate recording studio. 235 When taking a common-sense approach to the
circumstances as a whole, it is clear the public speech nature and the artistic
elements to Bell’s speech were authentic. If school administrators are
concerned about future students attempting to use the intent and purpose prong
as a loophole, the standard permits a flexible analysis to take into account the
circumstances surrounding these claims.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision in Bell failed to take into account the evolving technology
present in our society, which is within reach of nearly every student in
America. Tinker is outdated in light of the internet and social media, and
confusion and lack of uniformity continues to plague lower courts. By
continuing to apply the forty-eight year old standard of Tinker and allowing
schools to punish off-campus speech any time it does or potentially could
cause a substantial disruption, schools have obtained an unprecedented and
unrestricted authority over students nearly twenty-four hours a day.
The Supreme Court bypassed the opportunity to weigh in on this topic and
provide guidance to lower courts when certiorari was denied to Bell in
February 2016. 236 As similar cases continue to come through the courts, the
opportunities for the Supreme Court to hear a case concerning internet-based
off-campus speech will continue to present themselves. Absent direct
commentary on the topic of off-campus speech in light of modern technology,
the Supreme Court is allowing schools to reach beyond the schoolhouse gates
and infringe on parents’ roles in raising and disciplining their children, as well
as infringing upon the free-speech rights of today’s youth. A clear standard is
needed now more than ever, to balance the necessity of keeping schools safe

232. See Bell, 799 F.3d at 428 (Dennis, J, dissenting); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d
981, 990 (9th Cir. 2001).
233. Bell, 774 F.3d at 283 (5th Cir. 2014) reh’g en banc granted, 782 F.3d 712 (5th Cir.
2015) reh’g en banc, 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
234. Bell, 799 F.3d at 428 (Dennis, J, dissenting).
235. Id.
236. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
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and the rights of students to freely express themselves once they exit the
schoolhouse gates.
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